This paper suggests that medically the term a 'human being' should be defined by the presence ofan active human brain. The brain is the only unique and irreplaceable organ in the human body, as the orchestrator ofall organ systems and the seat ofpersonality. Thus, the presence or absence ofbrain life truly defines the presence or absence ofhuman life in the medical sense. When viewed in this way, human life may be seen as a continuous spectrum between the onset ofbrain life in utero (eight weeks gestation), until the occurrence ofbrain death. At any point human tissue or organ systems may be present, but without thepresence ofafunctional human brain, these do not constitute a 'human being', at least in a medical sense.
The implications ofthis theoryfor various ethical concerns such as in vitro fertilisation and abortion are discussed.
This theory is the most consistentpossiblefor the definition ofa human being with no contradictions inherent. However, having a good theory ofdefinition ofa 'human being' does not necessarily solve the ethical problems discussed herein. Over the last four years in the United States another round of controversy about therapeutic abortions has begun. Just as in earlier debates, an apparent key issue has been the question of when human life begins. Scientists and physicians who appeared before a US Senate Committee either stated that human life began at conception or that it began some time later, probably at the point where the fetus could survive outside the womb (the 'viability' theory), but that they were not quite sure (1) .
In the autumn of 1984 the matter was specifically raised during domestic issue debates between US Presidential candidates. President Reagan noted his belief that a fetus warranted constitutional protection as soon as it became a human being. He said that he must believe this occurred at the moment of conception unless scientists could more clearly establish when human life began.
Over the past year, several abortion clinics have been bombed by zealots claiming that they are avenging the 'murder' of fetuses. The divisiveness of the issue is
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clearly increasing.
Despite the worsening situation and the President's unexpected challenge, scientists seem to feel impotent and unable to aid the public in developing a consensus which could contribute to a societally acceptable solution to the abortion question.
Yet scientists and physicians have no difficulty in stating when a human being is alive so long as it has been born. I would contend that the process of birth, while still significant, is not any longer so important that it should render us tongue-tied as if witnessing an inexplicable miracle. There must be some point before birth when a human being truly begins to be alive. Can our medical scientific knowledge be used to define this point?
For over a decade, I have advocated a third position between an at-conception theory of biological humanness and the viability theory (2, 3) . Called the 'brain-life theory' this view suggests that the fetus is biologically a human being at the point at which its brain begins to function. In this decade, in 1981, the theory was propounded in a letter in the New Englandjournal of Medicine (4). More recently, that letter was discussed in theJournal ofMedical Ethics (5).
The purpose of this paper is to give the brain-life theory and its implications a fuller treatment than could be achieved in the short length of a letter. Hopefully this airing, coupled with the previous articles, will result in the closer consideration by ethicists, scientists and physicians and politicians which it richly deserves.
The potential implications of this alternative theory are also extremely important for diverse other issues besides abortion such as birth control, treatment of rape victims, fetal research, in vitro fertilisation (6) Before proceeding to the discussion, I need to state a few semantic definitions for the sake of clarity. I will be using the nouns 'human', 'human being' and 'fullhuman' synonymously to refer to creatures with the appropriate chromosomal material. The adjective 'human' may also be applied to tissues with the appropriate chromosomal material, but which I will argue are not sufficiently organised in a biological sense to be considered 'human beings'. The word 'humanness' also will refer to that which in the above sense qualifies biologically and genetically as 'human'. No non-biological implications should be attached to these words, though I will discuss the possible valueladen choices available once the basic biological definitions are established.
Therefore, I will seldom use the word 'person' in this paper, because I will be attempting to make scientifically based definitions which are relatively 'value-free' and objective. The term 'person' is highly value-laden and has many meanings depending on Consider, if you will, the case of an eighty-year-old person in an intensive care unit. Let us assume that he or she is being maintained on an external mechanical respirator. This eighty-year-old may be terminally ill, may not be able to survive without the respirator. But if that human being has a functioning brain, there is no doubt on the physician's part that he is dealing with a living patient. What is to be done for or to that patient is a wholly different set of decisions which may be made upon the basis of many other considerations, but no one would doubt that that human being is alive despite the fact that many bodily functions were being maintained mechanically.
Consider similarly a fetus. It is inside the most advanced intensive care unit ever designed -the uterus. And it is being maintained by the most complex extracorporeal respirator known -the placenta. If this fetus has reached the age of eight weeks, a wealth of evidence indicates that its brain has begun functioning electrically (7, 8, 9) . This fetus may be terminally ill, or it may continue to grow through its next eighteen years of life and to develop for the next eighty. It cannot survive without external ventilatory support. These things are a function of probabilities. What is a matter of fact is that medically ifa fetus is analysed in the same way as a born human, then at eight-weeks gestation with a functioning brain present, it is a living human being in the biological sense of that term.
In fact I would argue that when the fetus has a functioning brain, one cannot advance any logical argument to show that that fetus is not a living human being, at least from the point of view of medicine. Questions about the probabilities of that fetal human's future existence have no more place in that fundamental determination than they do in the case of the eighty-year-old (10, 11) . But they may be taken into account along with many other criteria in deciding how that human will be treated.
My view is that fundamentally, the positions of the eighty-year-old born human and the eight-week-old fetal human are analogous. I attach no ethical magic to the process of birth. But, for example, I know of no logical formulation which requires that if a human being is alive, it must a priori and under all circumstances be allowed to continue to live.
Before continuing, let me make clear to the reader what I mean by a 'functioning brain'. The brain can be divided into cortical and subcortical sections. The former controls most associative (ie thinking) structures. The latter 'primitive brain' influences behaviour and emotion, but primarily is concerned with regulating body functions. In determining 'brain death', the British argue (inter alia) that absence of reflexes from the subcortical (brain stem) area indicates death of the brain (and hence eventually of the body (12)), while in the United States, there is a requirement for cessation of brain waves measured by electroencephalograph (EEG) (10, 11, 13 Figure I ).
From first cell division to last cell death, we can see a spectrum of human existence ( Figure I ). For Concluding with regard to viability, one can also see that while it may be ethically reasonable to consider questions about viability when deciding when to treat or when to terminate life-support, these issues and this concept should not be confused with the biological definition of a human being.
2) IMPLICATIONS FOR ABORTION
The basic fact which the brain-life theory forces us to recognise is that an abortion before eight weeks gestation kills potential human life and that thereafter an actual human life is terminated. Three alternatives for law and policy become logical when the theory is accepted. i) One can choose the Catholic position -properly stated -that even potential life should be preserved, recognising the paradoxes and difficulties which we have already discussed plus those which will be added in further discussion.
ii) One can opt essentially to follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Row v Wade (17) . What the court saw was a question of rights in conflict. It stated that State interest in the fetus as having coequal rights begins only when the fetus has a reasonable chance of survival. This is a rational use of the concept of viability, not as a definition of humanness, but as a point when the State should extend equal protection. Clearly, the fact that late abortions kill a human being from my point of view does not a prioni mean that the State must not allow such killing. Proponents must, however, recognise that late abortions end an actual human life and not just a mass of tissue with human potential. Furthermore they must be aware of the fact that viability is likely to continue to occur earlier and earlier in gestation as medicine advances. iii) One could allow abortion 'on demand' up till the eighth week post-conception, but then require substantial reasons for later abortions which by the brain-life definition would cause a human being to die. For example, it might be acceptable to discontinue the placental 'assisted ventilation' for the same reasons that one could discontinue mechanical ventilatory assistance in ex utero humans, ie terminal illness (severe genetic anomaly), extremely poor prognosis for survival or quality of survival (high thoracic meningomyelocele) or brain damage not amounting to brain death (anencephaly (18)). If the clinician is honest with himself, this last alternative is not really satisfactory. Among the cases that really bother us is the case of the thirteen-year-old girl who is pregnant after being raped by her father. Given a supportive family, both the girl and the baby might do well, but in such a case the family is always irreparably flawed. Adoption after birth forces the unprepared, stigmatised and already traumatised teenager to go through the additional stress of nine months of pregnancy. Then, given the survival instincts built into women by millions of years of evolution, many adolescent women will 'bond' with their child and eventually refuse to give it up. To overcome this instinctual love and the fantasies which come with it requires a very mature thinking process. Many young teenagers simply have not yet developed that level of ability. The result from the point of view of clinical medicine is a disaster for mother, child, relatives and society in general. From a practical, clinical perspective, an abortion may often be by far the most satisfactory among unpleasant alternatives. Honest physicians recognise this as a core dilemma.
In addition, the fact that young women tend to deny early pregnancy signs, even though pregnancy can now be diagnosed by simple urine tests with great accuracy as soon as a menstrual period is missed, makes the third alternative seem unworkable. However, as so often happens, scientia ex machina is about to add a new wrinkle.
Within the next decade, a new class of very safe drugs will appear which function by blocking the action of the hormone progesterone at the cellular receptor sight. Interrupting the action of progesterone will cause termination of any pregnancy without a wellestablished placenta and perhaps beyond. Thus we will find ourselves faced with the first completely safe and universally effective 'morning after pill' and a simple, effective abortifacient which may replace suction as a method of choice for aborting very early pregnancies, ie those less than eight weeks gestation! I predict that this will become a very popular, publicly available back-up or even primary method of birth control. The brain-life theory has no ethical problem with the use of this early abortifacient and its advent may make the third policy alternative based on brain life the best alternative for developing societal consensus on this difficult issue. Very early abortions will become the norm and late abortions will be limited in numbers and for specific socially acceptable reasons. 
3) IMPLICATIONS FOR IN VITRO FERTILISATION

4) IMPLICATIONS FOR FETAL RESEARCH
The brain-life theory also offers a clear choice-point for contending with the ethics of fetal research. Prior to brain function, experimentation on cultured, aborted, or definitely-about-to-be-aborted embryonic tissue need not be subject to any special rules unless again we value potential as much as actuality.
After eight weeks there is a question of who could consent to research on the young human. In keeping with current practice, I would allow parents to consent for the child to in utero research which had passed muster by ethical review boards. If the fetus is aborted, but non-viable, then I would require a brain-death criterion to be met prior to experimentation, just as we would require in the case of any other human in transplantation or cadaveric research. This might limit some forms of research, but would be the only consistent approach. I will not go further since the full discussion of this concept would require a paper of its own. Suffice to say that brain-life criteria may play an important part in making ethical decisions as the possibilities for fetal research expand over the next two decades.
5) IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT OF RAPE VICTIMS
Female victims of rape may be at risk for pregnancy and therefore physicians offer them the use of a highdose oestrogen regimen (two high-dose oral contraceptive pills taken twice, twelve hours apart) to prevent a most unwanted conception. This 'morningafter' treatment is highly effective, but must be given within 72 hours of the rape (19) . Some such treatments, now rarely used, such as diethylstilboesterol injections, may be teratogenic or carcinogenic). The Catholic Church officially espouses the position that this treatment represents an abortion (20) . Thus, even though this is an emergency treatment, many Catholic hospitals forbid physicians from prescribing post-rape oestrogen anti-pregnancy prophylaxis (21) .
Some Catholic theologians have argued on the basis of theories of probabilities that post-coital contraception is not really an abortion (22) . That is, there is only a 'chance' of unknown proportion that a conceptus is killed. The brain-life theory simply states that such treatment kills no human life, though it prevents a probability of its occurrence. At most, a single human cell is prevented from implanting in the uterine lining. Thus in at least this instance, some Catholic theologians can already find some correspondence between their own views and the brain-life definition.
6) IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPOSAL OF FETAL REMAINS
'Right-to-life' groups have sued in court in California in order to be able to give aborted fetuses a religious burial. The brain-life theory says that society should not require such funerals until the fetal death encompasses a human ending -ie after the conception has reached eight weeks gestation.
Interestingly, those who argue for an 'at conception' definition of human being have not carried their argument in this area to its logical conclusion. If a fertilised ovum is a human being, and since significant numbers of human pregnancies never implant or abort rapidly because of genetic flaws, then it follows that many 'normal' female menses carry the 'body' of a dead human being! If one follows logic consistently, then women should bury their menstrual flow with due religious ceremony on the chance that a spontaneous abortion has occurred. This is not advocated by any civilised society and harkens back to ancient superstitious behaviour in primitive society. Yet it would be the logical extension of the theory that a single fertilised cell is indeed a human being.
Conclusion
By accepting a functioning brain as a medical definition for humanness, one can achieve a very reasonable, scientifically grounded and consistent view of human life. Such a definition allows us to look at all oflife from the development of a single cell to the death of the last cell in a body in the same way. We need not encounter any logical dilemmas if we apply a brain-life test and we can use it as an instrument to aid policy and ethical decisions. However, though this theory can improve and clarify the logic of those decisions, ultimately our social answers to ethical questions lie not in facts but in what value we put on those facts including a human life or its potential. No biological theory of humanness defines such values nor ever will. But a soundly based scientific definition of a human being can clarify decisions to the point where areas of potential societal compromise can become clearer.
Science can, in a relatively value-free manner, suggest a solid definition of when in the continuum of life a full human being exists. Will science consider the possibilities and take up President Reagan's challenge?
Dedication
The original work on the concepts presented in this paper was performed in the summer of 1975 at the Kennedy Institute for Bioethics at the Georgetown University Medical Center, while the author was still an undergraduate college student. This paper is dedicated to the memory of the late Andre Hellegers, MD, who at that time was the director of the Bioethics Institute. Dr Hellegers was one of the true giants of medicine in this century; clinician, scientist, philosopher, teacher, and above all, an incredibly educated human being. His steadfast dedication to openness in scientific and ethical pursuits allowed him to encourage the thinking of a heretical young student, even though the implications of the author's theory might prove unsettling to Dr Hellegers's strongly held ethical beliefs. Without Dr Hellegers this paper would never have been published. I miss his wise counsel, and so do all those concerned with medical ethics.
